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APPLE VS. ANDROID: GLOBAL 
SOFTWARE PATENTABILITY AND THE 
MOBILE OS WARS 
INTRODUCTION 
n Friday, August 24, 2012, a jury in San Jose, California 
awarded Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) a jury verdict exceeding 
one billion dollars in its patent infringement suit against Sam-
sung Electronics Company (“Samsung”).1 The verdict was the 
third-largest jury award ever seen in U.S. patent litigation.2 
The impact of the trial reverberated well beyond the immediate 
damages award; the Monday following the verdict, Samsung’s 
stock price dropped by 7.5%, representing a loss of approxi-
mately twelve billion dollars in market value.3 The technology 
press closely followed the trial and dubbed it the “Patent Trial 
of the Century.”4 The outsize verdict echoed throughout the in-
dustry and in the future may encourage timidity in smartphone 
design choices by Apple’s competitors in an industry that has 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. Nick Wingfield, Jury Awards $1 Billion to Apple in Samsung Patent 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technology/jury-reaches-decision-in-
apple-samsung-patent-trial.html. After a retrial on damages ordered by 
Judge Lucy Koh, Apple’s total liability stands at $929.8 million. Gerry Shih, 
U.S. Jury Awards Apple $290 Million in Retrial Against Samsung, REUTERS 
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/us-apple-samsung-
verdict-idUSBRE9AK19V20131121. This verdict is still subject to adjustment 
by Judge Koh. Florian Mueller, Retrial Jury Awards Apple $290 Million, To-
tal Damages in Case Against Samsung: $929 Million, FOSS PATENTS (Nov. 
21, 2013), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/11/retrial-jury-awards-apple-290-
million.html. 
 2. Cromwell Schubarth, Apple’s $1B Patent Win Is Third Biggest in U.S., 
SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Aug. 25, 2012, 9:27 AM PDT), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2012/08/25/apples-1b-patent-win-is-
third.html. 
 3. Miyoung Kim, Samsung Shares Drop $12 Billion after Apple’s Court 
Victory, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/27/us-samsung-shares-
idUSBRE87Q00120120827. 
 4. See, e.g., Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Apple v. Samsung: The Patent Trial of 
the Century Starts Today, FORTUNE (July 30, 2012), 
http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/07/30/apple-v-samsung-the-patent-trial-of-
the-century-starts-today. 
O
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coalesced around similar styles.5 While the sheer size of the 
verdict has captured the attention of the media, the San Jose 
trial represents just one of Apple’s plays in an elaborate, global 
litigation strategy including over fifty lawsuits spanning across 
ten countries.6 
The patent dispute between Apple and Samsung has rightly 
been viewed as one battle in a larger proxy war between Apple 
and another industry giant, Google.7 The two companies are 
jockeying for control over the mobile operating system (“OS”) 
industry, and their respective mobile operating systems, iOS 
and Android,8 are currently the top two mobile operating sys-
                                                                                                                                     
 5. Brian X. Chen & Lisa Alcalay Klug, A Verdict That Alters an Industry, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technology/a-
verdict-that-alters-an-industry.html. 
 6. In addition to the United States, Apple has sued Samsung in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, South Korea, 
Japan, and Australia. Florian Mueller, List of 50+ Apple-Samsung Lawsuits 
in 10 Countries, FOSS PATENTS (Apr. 28, 2012), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/04/list-of-50-apple-samsung-lawsuits-in-
10.html. Apple has also been involved in patent litigation against Motorola 
over Motorola’s use of the Android operating system in multiple United 
States District Courts, the International Trade Commission (“ITC”), and in 
Germany. Florian Mueller, Updated Lists of Android Patent Infringement 
Findings and Successful Countersuits, FOSS PATENTS (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/10/updated-lists-of-android-patent.html. 
Additionally, Apple and smartphone manufacturer HTC were engaged in 
litigation in both the ITC and the U.K. Chloe Albanesius, HTC Secures Pa-
tent Win Against Apple in U.K., PC MAG (July 5, 2012, 11:43 AM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2406730,00.asp. Apple and HTC have 
since settled all of their patent disputes pursuant to a ten-year licensing 
agreement. Ian Sherr, Apple, HTC Settle Patent Dispute, Sign Licensing Pact, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324894104578111792346747
174.html. 
 7. Alexei Orekovic & Poornima Gupta, Exclusive: Google, Apple CEOs in 
Secret Patent Talks, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/30/us-google-apple-
idUSBRE87T15H20120830. 
 8. Many consumers frequently confuse the Android software with the 
computing devices that utilize it. Android is an operating system developed 
by Google that is then licensed to manufacturers like Samsung. Marziah 
Karch, What Is Google Android?, ABOUT.COM, 
http://google.about.com/od/socialtoolsfromgoogle/p/android_what_is.htm (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
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tems by a large margin.9 iOS and Android currently enjoy re-
spective market shares of 14.9% and 75%, while the next most 
successful competitor, BlackBerry, controls only 4.3% of the 
market.10 Apple’s co-founder, Steve Jobs, famously told his bi-
ographer Walter Isaacson that he viewed Android as a “stolen 
product” and vowed to wage a “thermonuclear war” against 
Google for its release.11 However, rather than attacking Google 
directly, Apple has elected to sue companies that use Android 
in products that currently compete with Apple’s iPhone and 
iPad.12 Apple has yet to sue Google itself, instead targeting a 
number of consumer electronics manufacturers that sell devic-
es running Android, including Samsung, HTC Corp. (“HTC”), 
and Motorola.13 Some commentators speculate that this is be-
cause Google distributes Android free of cost under an open-
source license, and therefore does not directly profit from An-
droid, making damages much more difficult for Apple to 
prove.14 Nonetheless, a series of courtroom victories against 
manufacturers that use Android may encourage Apple to target 
Google, because some of Apple’s patent claims implicate fea-
tures that are found in the core Android operating system.15  
                                                                                                                                     
 9. Jessica E. Vascellaro & Amir Efrati, Google, Apple Tighten Grip on 
Smartphone Market, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303379204577474794114369
320.html. Combined, iOS and Android lead the next competitor, BlackBerry, 
by over 85% of the total market share. Dara Kerr, Android Beats iOS 5-to-1 
in Q3 Smartphone Market Share, CNET (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57544131-94/android-beats-ios-5-to-1-in-
q3-smartphone-market-share. 
 10. Kerr, supra note 9. 
 11. Connie Guglielmo, Apple Analysts Call Verdict an Important Victory in 
‘Thermonuclear War’ with Google Android, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2012, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/connieguglielmo/2012/08/27/apple-analysts-call-
verdict-an-important-victory-in-thermonuclear-war-with-google-android/. 
 12. Claire Cain Miller & Brian X. Chen, Samsung Case Puts Apple Closer 
to Google Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/technology/samsung-case-puts-apple-
closer-to-fight-with-google.html. 
 13. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Will Apple Now Sue Google?, FORTUNE (Aug. 25, 
2012, 7:58 PM EDT), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/08/25/will-apple-now-
sue-google. 
 14. Miller & Chen, supra note 12. 
 15. Most of Apple’s infringement claims against Samsung arose from its 
TouchWiz “skin,” a software modification that changes the appearance of the 
operating system. Ryan Whitwam, How the Apple-Samsung Case Could Push 
OEMs Closer to Google and Stock Android, EXTREME TECH (Aug. 28, 2012, 
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This patent dispute comes at a time when many in the tech-
nology industry are becoming skeptical about the usefulness of 
software patents in fostering innovation.16 One of the more vo-
cal critics is U.S. Circuit Judge Richard Posner.17 Judge Posner 
elected to preside over the Apple v. Motorola litigation in the 
Northern District of Illinois in the summer of 2012.18 Despite 
finding that the patents were valid and infringed, Judge Pos-
ner cancelled the jury trial and dismissed the case because, in 
his opinion, neither party could prove damages nor “establish a 
right to relief.”19 In an interview, Judge Posner questioned 
whether patents are necessary in the software industry—
without patents, innovative software companies would still re-
ceive the benefit of being first to market.20 He also expressed 
                                                                                                                                     
10:01 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/computing/135108-how-the-apple-
samsung-case-could-push-oems-closer-to-google-and-stock-android. However, 
some of Apple’s patents, including the patent for distinguishing between sin-
gle and multiple finger touches on a touchscreen, are built into the stock ver-
sion of Android developed by Google. These features could eventually lead to 
patent claims by Apple against Google itself. Miller & Chen, supra note 12. 
 16. Michael J. Miller, Software Patents Mean More Litigation, Less Inno-
vation, PC MAG (Aug. 28, 2012, 5:13 PM EST), 
http://forwardthinking.pcmag.com/none/302064-software-patents-mean-more-
litigation-less-innovation. 
 17. Michael Hiltzik, Blame a Dysfunctional Patent System for the Apple vs. 
Samsung Verdict, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/28/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20120828. 
 18. Dan Levine, Judge Who Shelved Apple Trial Says Patent System out of 
Sync, REUTERS (Jul. 5, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-
apple-google-judge-idUSBRE8640IQ20120705. 
 19. Order of June 7, 2012 at 1, Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-
08540 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2012). 
 20. Levine, supra note 18. Being the “first-mover” is generally considered 
to confer a competitive advantage on the first company to market a type of 
product or enter a certain market. See First Mover, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/firstmover.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 
2013). Some question whether software patents are necessary in light of how 
quickly software markets develop, arguing that the first-mover advantage is 
sufficient incentive to encourage innovation. See Brian J. Love, No: Software 
Patents Don’t Spur Innovation, but Impede It, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873233354045784446838
87043510 (arguing that new market entrants in the software field focus on 
innovation rather than obtaining patent protection for their ideas). Under 
this view, software patents impose high costs on innovation because they are 
typically obtained by incumbent firms rather than new market entrants and 
enormous amounts of money that could be spent on research in development 
is instead spent on obtaining and litigating patents. Id. 
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concern that companies are using software patents to stifle 
competition.21 It is common industry practice to acquire mas-
sive patent portfolios in order to defend against litigation, al-
most a legal version of the mutually assured destruction para-
digm seen during the Cold War.22 Indeed, Google stated that it 
purchased Motorola Mobility merely to acquire Motorola’s im-
pressive portfolio of approximately 17,000 patents.23 The iOS 
and Android patent dispute therefore serves as a useful case 
study for the effects on a global industry when a powerful play-
er decides to aggressively litigate its patents and seek an in-
junction in courts rather than negotiating a licensing agree-
ment.24 
One common thread connecting the lawsuits in the global 
Apple-Android legal battle is the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement” or 
“TRIPs”).25 Signed in 1994, the TRIPs Agreement attempted to 
harmonize global intellectual property (“IP”) law by requiring a 
minimum level of IP protection of its signatory countries.26 The 
                                                                                                                                     
 21. Levine, supra note 18. 
 22. Just as superpowers obtained massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons 
during the Cold War to deter against nuclear attack, today technology com-
panies hoard software patents as a strategy to deter high-stakes patent law-
suits. See Alex Blumberg & Laura Sydell, When Patents Attack, NPR (Jul. 26, 
2011, 8:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/26/138576167/when-
patents-attack. 
 23. Jacob Goldstein, Google Escalates the Patent Arms Race, NPR (Aug. 15, 
2011, 12:08 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/08/15/139639032/google-escalates-
patent-arms-race. 
 24. Although Apple has offered a licensing arrangement to Samsung, Boris 
Teskler, Director of Patent Licensing Strategy at Apple, testified at trial that 
Apple is not interested in licensing certain patents relating to iOS’s user in-
terface (“UI”) to Samsung. See Megan Geuss, Apple v. Samsung: Apple Says 
It Has No Interest in Licensing Its Patents, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 10, 2012, 9:05 
PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/apple/2012/08/apple-v-samsung-apple-has-
no-interest-in-licensing-its-patents. 
 25. TRIPs is central to the Apple-Android patent dispute because it articu-
lated a global standard for what types of inventions are patentable. See 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement]. 
 26. Adam Isaac Hason, Domestic Implementation of International Obliga-
tions: The Quest for World Patent Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 373, 376 (2002). 
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TRIPs Agreement applies to all members of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”).27 The two forum countries discussed in 
this paper, the United States and the United Kingdom, are 
both members of the WTO and are therefore signatories to the 
TRIPs Agreement.28 Since the WTO has 159 member countries, 
TRIPs has an extremely broad base.29 Given such wide adher-
ence, TRIPs is an excellent starting point for discussing poten-
tial changes to international patent law. 
Several aspects of the TRIPs Agreement are relevant to soft-
ware patents. First, some groups contest whether TRIPs even 
requires patent protection for software in the first place.30 Sec-
ond, TRIPs requires signatory countries to issue patents for a 
minimum of twenty years, and the twenty-year term applies 
regardless of subject matter or technological field.31 Third, 
TRIPs mandates that its signatory countries offer injunctive 
relief as a remedy for patent infringement.32 Given the rapid 
rise and fleeting market life of consumer electronics globally, 
the TRIPs Agreement should be updated to reduce the mini-
mum patent period for software applications from twenty years 
to five years, and provide for a specific definition under Article 
27 of what constitutes an “inventive step . . . capable of indus-
trial application,”33 which would streamline international pa-
                                                                                                                                     
 27. Kelvin W. Willoughby, How Much Does Technology Really Matter in 
Patent Law? A Comparative Analysis of Doctrines of Appropriate Patentable 
Subject Matter in American and European Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 63, 
77 (2008). 
 28. Understanding the WTO: The Organization—Members and Observers, 
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 2, 2013), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Article 10 of the TRIPs Agreement states that software is to be afford-
ed protection under the Berne Convention, which provides for copyright pro-
tection. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 25, art. 10. Additionally, TRIPs 
does not specifically require patents in any particular field, but rather “in-
ventions . . . in all fields of technology.” Id. art. 27. 
 31. Id. art. 27. 
 32. Id. art. 29. 
 33. Under the TRIPs Agreement, an invention must be “new, involve an 
inventive step and [be] capable of industrial application” in order to be pa-
tentable. Id. art. 27. These requirements have led to uncertainty and gener-
ated differing views on what types of software are patentable under the trea-
ty. See Charles R. McManis, Taking TRIPs on the Information Superhighway: 
International Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Tech-
nology, 41 VILL. L. REV. 207, 247–48 (1996). 
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tent litigation, reduce litigation costs for both patent holders 
and patent-issuing countries, and reduce industry reliance on 
high-volume but low-quality patent portfolios as a primary pa-
tent strategy.34 
Part I of this paper will provide background on the signifi-
cance of the Apple-Android patent dispute, as well as an over-
view of two recent cases, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. 
in the United States, and HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc. in 
the United Kingdom. Part II will discuss how TRIPs has im-
pacted patent law globally and provide an overview of software 
patentability in the United States and the U.K. Part III will 
analyze how TRIPs fails to provide guidance on software pa-
tentability by analyzing the results of the Apple Inc. v. Sam-
sung Electronics Co. LTD and HTC v. Apple Inc. cases. Finally, 
Part IV will discuss potential modifications to the TRIPs 
Agreement that would provide for increased competition in the 
fields of software and consumer electronics.  
I. BACKGROUND 
The Apple-Android patent dispute comes as the computing 
industry is shifting from desktops and laptops to mobile devic-
es, providing an opportunity for companies to cement them-
selves as key players in an emerging market.35 This section will 
discuss the significance of the patent disputes in light of these 
changes, and provide an overview of how the dispute is playing 
out in U.S. and U.K. courts. 
A. The Significance of the Apple-Android Patent Dispute 
The ultimate outcome of this global patent battle will have a 
profound effect on the landscape of mobile computing for years 
to come.36 Shipments of new smartphones have surpassed 
shipments of new personal computers.37 Apple capitalized on 
                                                                                                                                     
 34. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 42 (2005). 
 35. Claire Cain Miller, In Mobile World, Tech Giants Scramble to Get Up 
to Speed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/technology/in-mobile-world-tech-giants-
struggle-to-get-up-to-speed.html. 
 36. Chen & Klug, supra note 5. 
 37. Chloe Albanesius, Smartphone Shipments Surpass PCs for First Time. 
What’s Next?, PC MAGAZINE (Feb. 8, 2011, 12:53 PM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2379665,00.asp. This trend is particu-
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this trend with its iPhone and iPad, the prolific sales of which 
vaulted Apple to the position of the wealthiest company in the 
world by market capitalization, overtaking even the oil giant 
Exxon-Mobil.38 Whoever ultimately wins the battle for mobile 
operating system market share will reap both huge profits and 
tremendous control over the fastest-growing sector in compu-
ting.39 
To understand the tremendous implications of this patent 
dispute, one need not look further than the operating system 
war that Apple and Microsoft waged during the 1980s and 
1990s.40 The results of this battle are clear: approximately 90% 
of the world’s personal computers currently run some version of 
Windows.41 The two companies took very different approaches 
to computing, with Apple designing both hardware and soft-
ware as one package, and Microsoft designing software to li-
cense to its hardware partners.42 In this sense, iOS is very 
much like the original MacIntosh (“Mac”), a closed system de-
signed top to bottom by Apple, while Android resembles Win-
dows as a platform that can be licensed for use on an array of 
                                                                                                                                     
larly true in developing countries, where low-cost mobile devices have become 
the primary means of accessing the Internet for over 50% of smartphone us-
ers. New Internet Audience Emerges in Developing Countries, ON DEVICE 
RESEARCH (Mar. 15, 2011, 10:05), http://ondeviceresearch.com/blog/new-
internet-audience-emerges-in—developing-countries. This is partially due to 
the fact that the lower price of smartphones provides a lower barrier to entry 
to Internet access. See Mobile Devices on the Rise: Their Impact on our Lives 
and on Networks, ITU NEWS (Apr. 2011), https://itunews.itu.int/en/533-
Mobile-devices-on-the-rise.note.aspx. 
 38. Adam Satariano, Apple Overtakes Exxon Becoming World’s Most Valu-
able Company, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-09/apple-rises-from-near-
bankruptcy-to-become-most-valuable-company.html. 
 39. See Peter Burrows, Apple vs. Google, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 
14, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_04/b4164028483414.htm. 
 40. See Daniel Eran Dilger, iPhone Patent Wars: Apple’s $1.1 Billion ARM 
Injection Ignites a Mobile Patent Race, APPLE INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/08/12/iphone-patent-wars-apples-11-
billion-arm-injection-ignites-a-mobile-patent-race. 
 41. Desktop Operating System Market Share, NETMARKETSHARE, 
http://www.netmarketshare.com/operating-system-market-
share.aspx?qprid=10&qpcustomd=0 (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 42. Scott Martin et al., Microsoft Unveils Surface Tablets, USA TODAY 
(Jun. 18, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-06-
18/microsoft-surface-tablet/55676790/1. 
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different hardware. Steve Jobs was furious when he discovered 
that after Bill Gates visited Apple’s campus, Microsoft intended 
to design an operating system with a graphical user interface 
that would compete with the Mac,43 an idea that Apple alleged-
ly took from Xerox.44 Apple is surely mindful of another operat-
ing system war, as Android’s market share skyrocketed shortly 
after its release.45 As Android trends toward similar domi-
nance, reminiscent of Windows, a large patent award could 
benefit Apple through licensing fees or an outright injunction.46 
Even if Apple cannot attain injunctions in this round of law-
suits, Apple could demand licensing fees from manufacturers 
using the “free” Android operating system,47 eating into their 
profits and making Android a less attractive option compared 
to other alternatives.48 
                                                                                                                                     
 43. Lee Moran, Revealed: The Dinner with a Microsoft Employee That Irri-
tated Steve Jobs So Much He Created the iPad, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2053242/Steve-Jobs-iPad-idea-
originated-dinner-Microsoft-employee-irritated-him.html. 
 44. Lawrence M. Fisher, COMPANY NEWS; Xerox Sues Apple Computer 
over Macintosh Copyright, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 1989), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/15/business/company-news-xerox-sues-
apple-computer-over-macintosh-copyright.html. 
 45. Google Android Phone Shipments Increase by 886%, BBC NEWS (Aug. 
2, 2010), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-10839034. 
 46. Charles Arthur, Apple to Seek Injunction Against Samsung 
Smartphones and Tablets, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/aug/25/apple-samsung-
injunction-fine. 
 47. Although Google currently licenses Android for free, Microsoft has as-
sessed substantial licensing fees against several manufacturers. Over 50% of 
Android phones are subject to such agreements with Microsoft. It is estimat-
ed that the manufacturer HTC pays Microsoft a royalty of $5 per smartphone 
that uses Android. Thus, while Google does not charge for using Android, 
using it is not “free,” and additional license fees to Apple would only increase 
its cost relative to other alternatives. See Jon Brodkin, Microsoft Collects Li-
cense Fees on 50% of Android Devices, Tells Google to “Wake up”, ARS 
TECHNICA (Oct. 23, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2011/10/microsoft-collects-license-fees-on-50-of-android-devices-
tells-google-to-wake-up. 
 48. Apple has demanded licensing fees of up to $30 per device from Sam-
sung, which could dramatically raise the licensing fees associated with An-
droid. Samsung has thus far refused Apple’s offer. See Florian Mueller, What 
Apple’s 2010 $30-per-unit Licensing Proposal to Samsung Means for Android 
in 2012 and Beyond, FOSS PATENTS (Aug. 11, 2012, 5:01 PM), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/08/what-apples-2010-30-per-unit-
licensing.html. HTC has entered into a ten-year licensing agreement with 
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B. Analyzing Apple’s Global Patent Lawsuits Through the 
TRIPs Agreement in the United States and the United Kingdom 
One of the primary treaties addressing substantive patent 
law is the TRIPs Agreement, signed in 1994.49 A primary goal 
of the TRIPs Agreement was to address the growing issue of 
international intellectual property violations due to a lack of 
international patent enforcement.50 In order to address these 
issues, the TRIPs Agreement sought to establish a baseline of 
protection for patents, copyright, and trademark by requiring 
its signatory countries to implement a minimum level of IP 
protection via statute.51 Some of the provisions implemented to 
achieve this goal are a requirement for the patentability of in-
ventions regardless of the field of technology, a twenty-year 
minimum patent period, and the ability to enforce patent rights 
through the issuance of an injunction.52 The TRIPs Agreement 
therefore harmonized international patent law by requiring its 
signatories to adopt a minimum level of patent protection.53 
However, some major outliers persist; the TRIPs Agreement is 
binding on individual member states of the European Union, 
but it is not binding on the European Patent Office, which is-
sues patents covering all EU member states.54 This lack of uni-
formity is best observed in a global patent war such as the re-
cent Apple-Android patent dispute, where courts in different 
signatory countries have enforced similar patents in radically 
different ways.55 
                                                                                                                                     
Apple, although the license fee has not been disclosed to the public. Samsung 
Files Redacted Copy of Apple-HTC Deal in U.S. Court, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/06/us-apple-samsung-
idUSBRE8B505Y20121206. A judge has ordered Apple to disclose the terms 
of the agreement to Samsung. Id. 
 49. Hason, supra note 26, at 374. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 376. 
 52. Id. at 377–78. 
 53. Id. at 386–87. 
 54. Id. at 386. 
 55. As discussed infra in Part III, one of Apple’s U.S. patents was found to 
be valid at trial, contributing to the one billion dollar jury verdict, while a 
similar European patent was found to be invalid in the U.K. as excluded sub-
ject matter. 
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1. The United States: A Record Jury Award for Apple 
As mentioned above, the Apple v. Samsung trial in California 
granted Apple one of the largest patent victories ever seen in 
U.S. litigation.56 While a modern smartphone implicates poten-
tially hundreds of thousands of patents,57 Apple asserted only 
seven against Samsung.58 Apple alleged that a total of twenty-
eight Samsung devices infringed upon these patents.59 Of pri-
mary importance was U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (“the ‘915 pa-
tent”), which describes “application programming interfaces for 
scrolling operations”60 and covers software that can distinguish 
between single-touch scrolling input and multi-touch pinch-to-
zoom input.61 The jury found that twenty-one Samsung devices 
infringed upon the ‘915 patent.62 In total, the jury awarded Ap-
ple over one billion dollars for Samsung’s infringements.63 Fur-
ther, the jury found that Samsung willfully infringed upon six 
of Apple’s patents, which could have exposed Samsung to treble 
damages.64 While the damages awarded were reduced following 
a retrial, Samsung remains liable for almost one billion dollars, 
                                                                                                                                     
 56. Wingfield, supra note 1. 
 57. The Android Patent War: An Apple Trade Claim Could Bar Imports of 
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CNET NEWS (Aug. 24, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-
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CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 13, 2012), 
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 60. U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (filed Jan. 7, 2007). 
 61. German, supra note 58. 
 62. Amended Verdict Form at 3, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 
No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Verdict Form]. 
 63. Wingfield, supra note 1. 
 64. Lance Whitney, Apple Wants $3B in Damages from Samsung, Says 
Report, CNET NEWS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-
57515675-37/apple-wants-$3b-in-damages-from-samsung-says-report. Judge 
Koh eventually rejected the jury’s finding of willful infringement and denied 
Apple treble damages. Florian Mueller, Judge, Unlike Jury, Finds Samsung’s 
Infringement of Apple’s Patents Was not Willful, FOSS PATENTS (Jan. 30, 
2013), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/01/judge-overrules-jury-finds-
samsungs.html. 
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and Apple has a renewed opportunity to seek a permanent in-
junction against infringing Samsung products.65 
2. HTC v. Apple in the U.K.: Defeat for Software Patents “As 
Such” 
In addition to its international legal battle against Samsung, 
Apple has also been involved in litigation internationally with 
other manufacturers that use Android, including Taiwan-based 
HTC Corp.66 HTC’s suit against Apple in the U.K. provides an 
important counterpoint to Apple v. Samsung in the United 
States because it implicates similar patents.67 HTC filed suit 
against Apple in the U.K. on July 29, 2001,68 in two separate 
actions to invalidate three of Apple’s European patents.69 When 
Apple then sued HTC under a fourth patent, HTC counter-
claimed to have that patent invalidated.70 The first patent the 
court considered, European Patent No. 2098948, enables “rec-
ognizing single and multiple point and touch events in multi-
point and multi-touch enabled devices.”71 The court found that 
HTC’s devices did not infringe this patent, and further that the 
patent was invalid as excluded subject matter.72 The second 
patent, European Patent No. 1964022, describes “unlocking a 
device by performing gestures on an unlock image.”73 Apple’s 
                                                                                                                                     
 65. Mueller, supra note 1. 
 66. Aleksi Tzatzev, Apple’s New iPhone Could Put It at the Center of a 
“Thermonuclear” Patent War, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2012, 6:10 PM), 
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 67. See HTC Defeats Apple in Swipe-to-Unlock Patent Dispute, BBC NEWS 
(July 4, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-18709232. 
 68. Florian Mueller, Apple’s Dispute with HTC Goes Global: HTC Files 
Lawsuit in the UK, FOSS PATENTS (Aug. 1, 2011, 8:21 PM), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2011/08/apples-dispute-with-htc-goes-global-
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 69. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [1]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. European Patent No. 2098948 (filed Apr. 3, 2009). 
 72. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [363]. 
“Excluded subject matter” refers to things that are not considered to be in-
ventions and are therefore excluded from patentability by statute. Avi Free-
man, Patentable Subject Matter: The View from Europe, INT’L FREE & OPEN 
SOURCE L. REV., Sept. 2011, at 59, 60. 
 73. European Patent No. 1964022 (filed Nov. 30, 2006). The High Court 
opinion incorrectly states the patent number as 2964022. See Florian 
Mueller, UK High Court Clears HTC of Infringement of Four Apple Patents—
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claims on this patent were found to be invalid for obviousness, 
although the patent was not found to be invalid as excluded 
subject matter.74 The third patent, European Patent No. 
2059868, covers a user interface design for scrolling through 
photographs on small screens.75 The court found that HTC’s 
devices did not infringe upon this patent, though it was not in-
validated as excluded subject matter.76 The final patent, Euro-
pean Patent No. 1168859, involved the use of a multilingual 
keyboard.77 This patent was found to be invalid as obvious in 
light of prior art, but was not found to be excluded subject mat-
ter.78 The results of HTC v. Apple stand in stark contrast to the 
results of Apple v. Samsung in the United States, as HTC was 
cleared of all infringement allegations and three out of the four 
patents that Apple asserted against HTC were found to be in-
valid.79 
II. THE PATENTABILITY OF SOFTWARE INTERNATIONALLY 
As the primary treaty addressing subject matter patentabil-
ity, TRIPs has the potential to exert great influence on the le-
gal standards that nations apply to software patents. This sec-
tion will provide an overview of how TRIPs has influenced sub-
stantive patent law internationally, as well as the applicable 
legal standards that have developed in the United States and 
the U.K. 
A. The Impact of the TRIPs Agreement on Substantive Patent 
Law Globally 
The TRIPs Agreement represented a significant change in in-
ternational patent law by requiring signatory countries to 
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 76. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [363]. 
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 78. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [363]. 
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adopt its requirements into domestic patent law.80 Previous pa-
tent law treaties, such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(“PCT”), only enacted procedural changes such as global patent 
applications.81 TRIPs went one step further by requiring signa-
tory countries to adopt a minimum global standard for IP pro-
tection implemented in domestic law.82 The domestic imple-
mentation requirement has caused some to describe TRIPs as 
“the most ambitious intellectual property convention ever at-
tempted,” as it is difficult to persuade countries to implement 
changes to domestic law in order to protect foreign intellectual 
property interests.83 This global standard was in some respects 
even stricter than the domestic requirements of countries that 
already had robust patent protection, and therefore represent-
ed a tightening of global patent protection.84 However, the 
agreement was signed in 1994, while the software and mobile 
devices industries were in relative infancy. 
While TRIPs has laid substantial groundwork for global pa-
tent harmonization, several of its provisions are quite ambigu-
ous and have led to interpretation issues. For example, it is not 
clear that TRIPs even requires patent protection for software, 
and this question has been the subject of some debate.85 Article 
10 of the TRIPs Agreement provides that “[c]omputer pro-
grams, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as 
literary works under the Berne Convention (1971).”86 Some ad-
                                                                                                                                     
 80. Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and Intellectual Property Protection in an Age 
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 83. Hasson, supra note 26, at 374. 
 84. Prior to the TRIPs Agreement, the patent term in the United States 
was seventeen years after the date of grant. In the U.K., the term was sixteen 
years after the date of filing, and in Germany, it was eighteen years from the 
date of filing. By extending the term of patent protection to twenty years, 
TRIPs increased the term of patent protection in all three countries. See Mi-
chael Guntersdorfer, Software Patent Law: The United States and Europe 
Compared, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 6, 29 (2003). 
 85. See Charfoos, supra note 82, at 263 (discussing the failure of TRIPs to 
address whether software is patentable subject matter per se as a weakness 
in the treaty). 
 86. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 25, art. 10. 
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vocates of more modest software patent protection have used 
this provision to argue that the TRIPs Agreement intended to 
protect software under copyright, but not with patent protec-
tion.87 Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement, however, provides 
that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether 
products or processes in all fields of technology.”88 Proponents 
of strong patent protection argue that this provision mandates 
that software receive patent protection as a “field of technolo-
gy.”89 Some scholars argue that these two provisions are in fact 
compatible, as patents provide stronger protection than copy-
right, and the two systems therefore complement one another.90 
The ambiguity of whether software patents are required un-
der TRIPs can be seen in disparities in patent law in individual 
signatory countries. U.S. courts have held for quite some time, 
even prior to the TRIPs Agreement, that software is patentable 
subject matter.91 In Europe, however, the European Patent 
Convention (“EPC”) explicitly excludes computer programs “as 
such” from patentable subject matter.92 Although the European 
Patent Office (“EPO”) is not a signatory to the TRIPs Agree-
ment, and therefore is not bound by its terms,93 each individual 
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European member state is a signatory to TRIPs as a WTO 
member.94 Additionally, patents issued by the EPO apply to EU 
member states, although they are subject to interpretation un-
der each member state’s domestic law.95 Decisions of the EPO 
can still influence the substantive law of member states. For 
example, while U.K. courts are bound to follow their own prec-
edent, EPO decisions are treated as persuasive authority.96 
Further, achieving consistent results over an individual patent 
case filed in multiple forums is a compelling objective that may 
influence the decisions of U.K. courts.97 While both the EPO 
and U.K. courts have recognized that software is patentable in 
some instances, the view in Europe, and especially the U.K., is 
more restrictive than both U.S. common law and a literal read-
ing of the TRIPs Agreement.98 Ambiguity in this area of Article 
27 has therefore failed to clarify the threshold question of 
whether software is patentable subject matter in the first 
place, allowing disparate patentability standards to be adopted 
by signatories. 
The patentability of software is not the only area of Article 27 
that has generated confusion. Article 27 requires that patents 
be available in every technological field, “provided that they are 
new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial 
application.”99 While this requirement has analogies in both 
U.S. and European law, the requirements for subject matter 
patentability have been subject to intense litigation in both fo-
rums.100 This has caused courts on both sides of the Atlantic to 
accept and discard a multitude of different tests for patentabil-
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ity within a short period of time.101 The European and U.S. 
views on the patentability of software have largely con-
verged.102 However, differences remain, as the United States 
generally accepts “pure” software patents, while the EPO and 
the U.K. still find software programs “as such” to be statutorily 
excluded subject matter, requiring “something more” to be pa-
tentable.103 
B. U.S. Substantive Patent Law after TRIPs 
The TRIPs Agreement made several important changes to 
substantive patent law in the United States. The Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act (“URAA”) codified TRIPs into U.S. 
law.104 The most important change brought about by the im-
plementation of TRIPs in the United States was an extension 
of the patent term from seventeen years to twenty years.105 
While this marked a significant extension for patent terms, the 
actual term of a patent filed may be substantially shorter than 
twenty years, as patents under the URAA are measured from 
the date of filing rather than the date of issue.106 The URAA 
also allows for provisional applications, allowing a priority date 
that does not count toward the patent term. Furthermore, it 
allows for the use of foreign activity to show the date of inven-
tion.107 Finally, the URAA expanded the definition of infringe-
ment to “offers to sell,” increasing patent protection to include 
the marketing of infringing products.108 The URAA thus added 
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modest changes to U.S. patent law, the most significant being 
an extension of the patent term.109 The most important changes 
to U.S. patent law that contrast with European law occurred in 
the courts—where TRIPs provided precious little guidance. 
The U.S. Congress has long avoided addressing the issue of 
whether software is patentable, leaving the question largely to 
federal courts.110 The U.S. Supreme Court first considered 
whether software was patentable subject matter in 1972 in the 
case Gottschalk v. Benson.111 The Court rejected the claim due 
to its excessive breadth.112 However, the Court explicitly stated 
that its holding did not preclude the patentability of software 
programs, although it did not answer the question of patenta-
bility definitively.113 This holding left the door open for courts 
to explore the patentability of software in the future. 
The Supreme Court again considered the patentability of 
software in Diamond v. Diehr.114 That case involved a patent 
claim that described using constant temperature measure-
ments to adjust an algorithm in order to determine the precise 
time to finish the curing of rubber.115 The majority determined 
that the invention in Diehr was patentable because the appli-
cation of the algorithm created a more efficient method for cur-
ing rubber and created an industrial transformation of the sort 
that patents were designed to protect.116 Under this test, an 
invention involving an algorithm or software would be patent-
able as long as it provided a novel physical transformation, alt-
hough this was not a requirement for patentability.117 This 
physical transformation test is similar to the test currently 
used in the U.K. where “something more” is required for pa-
tentability of software.118 
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit be-
gan to move in the direction of increased patentability for soft-
ware applications lacking such a physical transformative step. 
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In In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit largely abandoned the 
Supreme Court’s physical transformation test with respect to 
claims involving software and algorithms.119 The court held 
that an invention is not excluded from patentability as an “ab-
stract idea” as long as it provides a “useful, concrete, tangible 
result.”120 Additionally, inventions could be implemented solely 
on a computer because “a general purpose computer in effect 
becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to 
perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from 
program software.”121 
In State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit held that mathematical algorithms are patent-
able subject matter provided that they are “useful,” in that they 
involve a “practical application of an abstract idea.”122 Soon af-
ter, in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit rejected the physical transformation test that the Su-
preme Court had adopted in Diehr.123 The court found that the 
physical transformation test “seem[ed] of little value” because 
after Diehr and Alappat, the mere use of mathematical algo-
rithms did not preclude patentability unless the invention did 
not provide a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”124 After 
these two cases, software no longer received special subject-
matter scrutiny, and was patentable if it produced a “useful, 
concrete, and tangible result.”125 
Following AT&T and State Street, the Supreme Court back-
pedaled on the Federal Circuit with respect to patentable sub-
ject matter.126 In Bliski v. Kappos, the Court considered a busi-
ness method patent that could protect investors against the 
risk of price changes in the energy market.127 In addition to re-
jecting the Federal Circuit’s physical transformation test, the 
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Court ruled that the invention was not patentable because it 
was an “abstract idea.”128 However, the Court declined to define 
what might make a “process” patentable, instead directing the 
lower courts to its decisions in Benson, Parker v. Flook, and 
Diehr.129 However, this holding increased ambiguity in the 
realm of patentable subject matter because the Supreme Court 
had never actually answered these questions.130 
While subject matter patentability remains ambiguous after 
Bilski, a few things are certain. First, software and business 
methods remain patentable subject matter, as the Supreme 
Court refused the opportunity to categorically exclude them.131 
Second, software does not need to be tied to a particular ma-
chine or involve a transformation of matter, as the Court re-
jected the Federal Circuit’s reasoning that the machine-or-
transformation test is the sole test for patentability.132 The only 
restriction that remains is that a software patent cannot be 
“too abstract.”133 While this ambiguous, undefined standard 
will likely be a thorn in the side of courts and the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for some time, it is 
clear that software remains broadly patentable in the United 
States.134 
C. U.K. Substantive Patent Law after TRIPs 
A survey of substantive patent law in the U.K. demonstrates 
that the U.K. treats software patentability quite differently 
than the United States, as the U.K. tends to take a much 
                                                                                                                                     
 128. Id. at 3231. 
 129. Id. In Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court considered a patent on a 
process that calculated an “alarm limit” that would maintain efficiency or 
avoid dangerous levels in certain industrial processes. Marsnik & Thomas, 
supra note 94, at 248–49. The only novel process in the invention was a 
mathematical algorithm, which would by itself be unpatentable. Id. at 249. 
The Court declined to rule on the patentability of software, but instead re-
quired patent examiners to remove any algorithm from the claimed invention 
and determine whether the process as a whole was new and useful. Id. 
 130. Stephen Pulley, An “Exclusive” Application of an Abstract Idea: Clari-
fication of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter After Bilski v. Kappos, 2011 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2011). 
 131. Id. at 1246. 
 132. Id. at 1245–46. 
 133. Id. at 1247. 
 134. Id. at 1249. 
2014] GLOBAL SOFTWARE PATENTABILITY  813 
stricter approach to subject matter exclusions.135 The Patent 
Act of 1977 (“U.K. Patent Act”) governs patent law in the 
U.K.136 Subject matter exceptions to the statute are covered by 
subsections 1(2), 4(A), and 76(A); with subsection 1(2) covering 
“as such” exclusions of the type used to find one of Apple’s mul-
ti-touch patents invalid in the HTC v. Apple case.137 Subsection 
1(2) of the U.K. Patent Act explicitly lists “a program for a 
computer” as one of the subject matter areas excluded by the 
statute “as such.”138 The U.K. patent statute therefore has 
more categorical subject matter exclusions and a specific exclu-
sion for computer software compared to patent legislation in 
the United States.139 These subject matter exclusions tend to be 
judicially created in the United States, as seen above.140 How-
ever, courts in the U.K. tend to construe these restrictions 
more narrowly in light of the policy behind patents.141 
The case of Shopalotto.com is an instructive starting point on 
how courts treat the patentability of software in the U.K. The 
patent at issue in Shopalotto involved “a computer apparatus 
configured to provide a lottery playable over the [I]nternet.”142 
In that case, Justice Pumfrey provided a general overview of 
the “technical contribution” requirement that may elevate a 
patent from a computer program “as such” to patentable soft-
ware.143 According to Justice Pumfrey, “an invention may be 
viewed as a solution to a concrete technical problem.”144 How-
ever, “[m]erely to program a computer so that it operates in a 
new way is not a solution to any technical problem . . . . It fol-
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lows that an inventive contribution cannot reside in excluded 
subject matter.”145 Under this test, for a computer program to 
be patentable it must either produce an effect outside of the 
computer or solve a technical problem within the computer.146 
Another case, Fujitsu Ltd.’s Patent Application, demonstrates 
an instance where the U.K. courts deemed software unpatent-
able as a computer program “as such.” In that case, the Court 
of Appeals of England and Wales considered a patent applica-
tion for a computer program capable of producing models of 
crystalline structures in place of plastic models.147 The court 
found that the invention was merely an implementation of a 
mental act through the use of software, and therefore was not 
patentable subject matter because it lacked a significant 
enough technical contribution.148 The court adopted the Exam-
iner’s view of the invention as “simply a conventional computer 
programmed to display the same images as were previously 
produced using plastic models,” and therefore the invention 
“[did] not involve a technical advance of the kind” necessary to 
constitute patentable subject matter.149 This reflects that the 
technical contribution of software must be outside of the pro-
gram itself and cannot be tied to a mental process. 
Finally, in Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., the England 
and Wales Court of Appeal proposed a four-part test to deter-
mine if computer software falls within patentable subject mat-
ter.150 The steps of the test are “1) properly construe the claim; 
2) identify the actual contribution; 3) ask whether it falls solely 
within the excluded subject matter; and 4) check whether the 
actual or alleged contribution is actually technical in na-
ture.”151 In AT&T Knowledge Ventures LP, the court laid out 
“useful signposts” to help determine whether software con-
tained a “technical effect” of the type envisioned in Aerotel that 
rendered software patentable.152 The “signposts” ask: 
                                                                                                                                     
 145. Id. 
 146. Crowne-Mohammed, supra note 135, at 473–74. 
 147. In the matter of Application No. 9204959:2 by Fujitsu Limited, [1997] 
RPC 608, [1997] EWCA (Civ) 1174. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [40]. 
 151. Id. 
 152. AT&T Knowledge Ventures LP, Re [2009] EWHC (Pat) 343, [40]. 
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1) whether the claimed technical effect has a technical effect 
on a process which is carried on outside the computer; 2) 
whether the claimed technical effect operates at the level of 
the architecture of the computer; that is to say whether the 
effect is produced irrespective of the data being processed or 
the applications being run; 3) whether the claimed technical 
effect results in the computer being made to operate in a new 
way; 4) whether there is an increase in the speed or reliability 
of the computer; 5) whether the perceived problem is over-
come by the claimed invention as opposed to merely being cir-
cumvented.153 
The Aerotel test is now the starting point for determining sub-
ject matter eligibility under subsection 1(2) of the U.K. Patent 
Act.154 
III. THE FAILURE OF TRIPS TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON THE 
GLOBAL APPLE-ANDROID PATENT DISPUTE 
As discussed above in Parts II.B and II.C, courts in the Unit-
ed States and the U.K. came to very different results when 
looking at similar cases on the patentability of software. This 
section will compare the results of two cases: Apple v. Samsung 
in the United States,155 and HTC v. Apple in the U.K.156 The 
analysis will focus on two Apple patents157 covering Apple’s 
“multi-touch” feature found in iOS.158 It will show that despite 
the similarity of these patents, the courts came to opposite con-
clusions. Part IV will then suggest changes to TRIPs to prevent 
such disparate results; including clarifying that software is pa-
tentable subject matter, while reducing the mandated patent 
                                                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at [41]. 
 154. Crowne-Mohammed, supra note 135, at 475. 
 155. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 24, 2012). 
 156. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789. 
 157. The patents referred to cover similar aspects of multi-touch input. One 
is filed with the USPTO, and one with the European Patent Office (“EPO”). 
The U.S. Patent is U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (filed Jan. 7, 2007). The Euro-
pean patent is European Patent No. 2098948 (filed Apr. 3, 2009), referred to 
as “the ‘948 patent.” 
 158. “Multi-touch” allows a user to control a computing device via touch 
screen with more than one finger. Multitouch Definition, PCMAG.COM, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,1237,t=multitouch&i=59067,00.a
sp (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
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term for software based on practical considerations of the soft-
ware market and software itself. 
A. Multi-touch in U.S. Courts and the USPTO: Valuable, but 
Nothing New 
The Apple v. Samsung lawsuit in San Jose, California ended 
in a jury verdict that was an enormous victory for Apple—the 
company was awarded over one billion dollars when the jury 
determined that Samsung had infringed on several of Apple’s 
patents.159 The validity of the ‘915 patent was also vindicat-
ed.160 The jury found that only three of the twenty-four devices 
at issue in the case did not infringe upon the ‘915 patent.161 To 
reach this conclusion, the jury was asked to engage in a multi-
part analysis.162 First, the jury was asked to answer whether 
each Samsung device directly infringed163 on the ‘915 patent 
through either “literal infringement”164 or infringement under 
the “doctrine of equivalents.”165 Next, the jury had to consider 
whether the ‘915 patent was invalid under a clear and convinc-
                                                                                                                                     
 159. Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple Wins Big in Patent Case, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
25, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444358404577609810658082
898.html. 
 160. Verdict Form, supra note 62, at 9. 
 161. Id. at 3. 
 162. See Final Jury Instructions, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 
No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Jury Instruc-
tions]. 
 163. Id. at 38–40. 
 164. A product was deemed to be literally infringing if every requirement of 
a patent claim was included in the product. Id. at 39. Apple asserted that 
Samsung infringed upon claim 8 of the ‘915 patent at trial. Florian Mueller, 
Apple Insists That Samsung’s Purported Workaround Still Infringes Pinch-to-
Zoom API Patent, FOSS PATENTS (Nov. 27, 2012), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/11/apple-insists-that-samsungs-
alleged.html. This claim covered distinguishing between a single finger and 
multiple fingers on a touchscreen. If a single finger is detected, the device will 
perform a scroll operation. If multiple fingers are detected, the device will 
“scal[e] the view” (zoom in or out). U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (filed Jan. 7, 
2007). 
 165. A product was deemed to infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if 
it “include[ed] parts or software instructions that [were] identical to the re-
quirements of the claim.” A feature was deemed to be equivalent if “a person 
of ordinary skill in the field would think that the differences between the part 
or software instructions and the requirement were not substantial at the 
time of the alleged infringement.” Jury Instructions, supra note 162, at 40. 
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ing evidence standard.166 The jury could invalidate the patent if 
it lacked an adequate written description, if it was not new due 
to prior art,167 if it fell under a statutory bar, or if it was “obvi-
ous.”168 Finally, the jury was asked to calculate damages based 
on lost profits, lost market share, and any reasonable royalties 
owed to Apple by Samsung.169 
The jury agreed with Apple that the ‘915 patent was valid170 
and had been infringed by Samsung.171 This was a boon to Ap-
ple—Apple considered the ‘915 patent to be the most valuable 
multi-touch patent that it was asserting at trial based upon the 
royalties that it was demanding from Samsung.172 The verdict 
form asked the jury to break down damages by infringing de-
vice, and not by patent, so it is unclear how much value the ju-
ry placed on the ‘915 patent.173 However, the total damage 
award was $1,049,343,540.174 
Samsung had argued in its trial brief that the ‘915 patent 
was not invalid, not on subject matter grounds, but because 
other multi-touch inventions constituted prior art.175 The jury 
disagreed with Samsung’s argument, as it found the ‘915 pa-
tent to be valid,176 even though it had the option to rule the pa-
tent invalid on these grounds.177 However, the USPTO later 
agreed with Samsung’s position.178 In an ex parte reexamina-
tion hearing, the USPTO found that all twenty-one claims of 
the ‘915 patent were invalid due to other multi-touch patents 
                                                                                                                                     
 166. Id. at 42. 
 167. Prior art constitutes devices, methods, publications, or patents that 
predate the patent at issue and contain all of its claim’s requirements. Id. at 
44. 
 168. Id. at 43–47. 
 169. Id. at 50–56. 
 170. Verdict Form, supra note 62, at 9. 
 171. Id. at 3. 
 172. Apple demanded $3.10 per unit utilizing the ‘915 patent, compared to 
$2.02 for the two other multi-touch utility patents that it asserted at trial. 
Florian Mueller, Tentatively Invalid: The Most Valuable Multitouch Patent 
Asserted by Apple at Samsung Trial, FOSS PATENTS (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/12/tentatively-invalid-most-valuable.html. 
 173. Verdict Form, supra note 62, at 16. 
 174. Id. at 15. 
 175. Samsung’s Trial Brief at 8, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 
11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012). 
 176. Verdict Form, supra note 62, at 9. 
 177. Jury Instructions, supra note 162, at 44. 
 178. Mueller, supra note 172. 
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that constituted prior art.179 The USPTO cited U.S. Patent No. 
7,724,242, a Japanese patent, and a 1991 academic paper as 
the prior art references.180 The ruling is only preliminary—
Apple will still have the opportunity to challenge the USPTO’s 
findings.181 
Two things are clear from looking at the ‘915 patent’s experi-
ence in the U.S. courts and at the USPTO. First, if valid, the 
patent is extremely valuable. Apple believed that the ‘915 pa-
tent was its most valuable multi-touch patent in its case 
against Samsung, and the multi-touch patent contributed to 
one of the largest jury verdicts in patent litigation history.182 
Second, even if the patent is invalid on prior art grounds, Sam-
sung’s failure to raise the prior art issue suggests that the pa-
tent is likely patentable subject matter.183 Since the ruling is 
only preliminary, the USPTO may well still find that the ‘915 
patent is valid.184 
B. Multi-touch in the U.K.: Not Even Patentable 
Apple’s European pinch-to-zoom patent had a very different 
experience in the U.K. The patent at issue in the HTC case was 
slightly different than the one litigated in the Samsung case. 
The patent covered software capable of distinguishing between 
single and multiple touches, however it also allowed individual 
applications to use “flags” to indicate to the operating system 
that multiple touches should be ignored if they were unneces-
                                                                                                                                     
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Bryan Bishop, Another Apple Patent Rejected by US Patent Office, but 
Its Fate Is Far from Certain, VERGE (Dec. 19, 2012, 5:48 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2012/12/19/3785788/another-apple-patent-rejected-
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 182. Schubarth, supra note 2. 
 183. Samsung initially raised a defense arguing that the ‘915 patent was 
not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in its Answer. Samsung 
Entities’ Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims to Apple Inc.’s 
Amended Complaint; and Demand for Jury Trial at 29, Apple, Inc. v. Sam-
sung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) [here-
inafter Samsung Answer]. When Samsung moved for summary judgment, 
however, it dropped this argument and instead only argued that its devices 
did not infringe on the ‘915 patent. Order Denying Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 22, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846-
LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Summary Judgment Order]. This 
strategy will be discussed in greater detail in Part III.C. 
 184. Bishop, supra note 181. 
2014] GLOBAL SOFTWARE PATENTABILITY  819 
sary.185 This approach was advantageous because software de-
velopment could be more costly and complex if all applications 
were required to process multiple touches.186 While this patent 
is somewhat different from the ‘915 patent asserted in Apple v. 
Samsung, they are largely similar, as both patents differenti-
ate between single and multiple touches and direct the operat-
ing system to perform a function after detecting multiple 
touches.187 Apple contended that an Android feature used in 
HTC phones used a similar flag process, thus violating Apple’s 
patent.188 
In analyzing whether this method was patentable, the HTC 
court applied the Aerotel test and the AT&T Knowledge Ven-
tures “signposts” to determine whether there was a “technical 
effect” within the meaning of Aerotel.189 Apple’s counsel con-
tended that the invention met all of the AT&T Knowledge Ven-
tures “signposts” for five reasons. First, the patent simplified 
software programming, a technical effect “outside the comput-
er.”190 Second, the invention “operated at the level of the archi-
tecture of the computer” because it was incorporated into the 
operating system.191 Third, the invention resulted in the com-
puter operating in a new way by providing a new set of applica-
tion programming interfaces192 that allowed software develop-
ers to send touch events selectively.193 Fourth, the invention 
                                                                                                                                     
 185. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [36]–
[37]. 
 186. European Patent No. 2098948 (filed Apr. 3, 2009). 
 187. Claim 8 of the ‘915 patent, the claim asserted at trial, distinguishes 
between single and multiple-point touches, interpreting single-point touches 
as a scroll command and multiple-point touches as a gesture command. U.S. 
Patent No. 7,844,915 (filed Jan. 7, 2007). The ‘948 patent at issue in the U.K. 
can distinguish between single and multiple touches, and allow applications 
to ignore multiple touches until the first touch is finished in order to elimi-
nate conflicting commands. European Patent No. 2098948 (filed Apr. 3, 
2009). 
 188. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [56]. 
 189. Id. at [13], [17]. 
 190. Id. at [92]. 
 191. Id. 
 192. An “application programming interface,” or API, is a command set that 
“allows programmers to use predefined functions . . . instead of writing them 
from scratch,” making programming easier. API (Application Programming 
Interface) Definition, TECHTERMS.COM, 
http://www.techterms.com/definition/api (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
 193. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [92]. 
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increased speed and reliability because it simplified application 
coding.194 Finally, the invention solved the problem that it was 
purported to address.195 
The court rejected all of Apple’s arguments and first reverted 
to the Aerotel test by asking what the invention’s contributions 
were and whether they were “wholly within excluded subject 
matter.”196 The court found that software “which processes the 
multi-touch input” was “plainly excluded subject matter.”197 So 
too was any contribution that made writing software easier, as 
“[t]he writing of programs for computers . . . fall[s] squarely 
within the exclusion of computer programs as such.”198 
The court then analyzed whether there was a relevant tech-
nical effect as Apple claimed.199 It concluded that ease of writ-
ing software could not be a relevant technical effect, as writing 
software was excluded, and increased ease “merely . . . re-
distribut[es] . . . the labour.”200 Additionally, Apple’s valid as-
sertion that the invention operated at the operating system 
level was insufficient because the patent only concerned opera-
tion on data in the form of touch events.201 Next, the new APIs 
did not cause the computer to work in a new way, as the inven-
tion “merely . . . redistribute[ed] . . . data processing within the 
device.”202 Finally, there was no evidence of an increase of 
speed or reliability, and the fact that the invention solved a 
problem was irrelevant “where the problem solved [was] entire-
ly within the computer.”203 Accordingly, the court found that 
the invention was not patentable, as it was a “computer pro-
gram as such.”204 
The results of the HTC v. Apple case illustrate the differences 
of the U.K.’s approach to software patentability in comparison 
to the United States. The court was very skeptical of Apple’s 
claims, rejecting every argument Apple made that the contri-
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bution of its ‘948 patent was “technical in nature.”205 In the 
end, the ‘948 patent was ruled to be invalid as non-patentable 
subject matter.206 Three other patents were asserted against 
HTC, each of which was found to be either invalid for obvious-
ness or in light of prior art, or not infringed by HTC.207 This 
stands in stark contrast to Apple v. Samsung, where Apple’s 
similar ‘915 patent was found to be valid and infringed.208 
C. Reconciling the Disparate Results Reached in the United 
States and the U.K. 
The disparate results reached in Apple v. Samsung and HTC 
v. Apple are in part due to the different approaches that the 
United States and the U.K. use to evaluate the patentability of 
software. Although the Apple v. Samsung court did not reach 
the issue of whether the ‘915 patent constituted patentable 
subject matter, this was because Samsung had dropped that 
argument. Samsung did assert an excluded subject matter de-
fense in its initial answer to Apple’s amended complaint.209 
However, when Samsung moved for summary judgment, it in-
stead argued that its devices did not infringe upon the ‘915 pa-
tent.210 Presumably, Samsung would have argued that the ‘915 
patent was ineligible subject matter in this motion if it felt that 
this was a strong claim, as a successful summary judgment mo-
tion on these grounds can rule a patent invalid.211 This would 
have eliminated the need for Samsung to defend against the 
‘915 patent at trial. Instead, it argued—unsuccessfully—that 
its devices did not infringe on the ‘915 patent.212 Samsung’s re-
fusal to bring such a powerful defense suggests that Samsung 
itself thought that the ‘915 patent would be found valid under 
the U.S. standard. 
                                                                                                                                     
 205. Id. at [93]. 
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By contrast, HTC was able to render Apple’s ‘948 patent in-
valid in the U.K. by challenging whether it was patentable sub-
ject matter in the first place.213 The fact that this multi-touch 
patent, similar to the one asserted in Apple v. Samsung, was 
rendered invalid illustrates the narrower view that the U.K. 
takes toward software patentability discussed above.214 In fact, 
the court’s reasoning suggested that the U.S. patent might not 
be patentable in the U.K., as it found that “the software which 
processes the multi-touch input . . . is plainly excluded subject 
matter.”215 Additionally, HTC argued that the other three Ap-
ple patents asserted at trial were excluded subject matter.216 
This shows that the differing legal standards impacted HTC 
and Samsung’s trial strategies, as HTC repeatedly asserted 
that Apple’s software patents were invalid, while Samsung de-
clined to even bring the argument in its summary judgment 
motion.217 The fact that such disparate legal standards, legal 
strategies, and results can be seen in two countries that are 
both signatories to TRIPs demonstrates that the treaty has not 
provided much guidance on what is patentable in the field of 
software. 
IV. MODIFYING TRIPS TO PROVIDE FOR INCREASED 
COMPETITION IN THE FIELDS OF SOFTWARE AND CONSUMER 
ELECTRONICS 
As demonstrated above, the TRIPs Agreement is vague as it 
applies to software, both in terms of whether it applies to soft-
ware and what it requires for software to be patentable.218 This 
has fostered great differences in the legal standards that its 
signatories have adopted for software patentability, leading to 
uncertainty in international patent litigation and influencing 
the legal strategies adopted by litigants.219 Additionally, the 
fast-moving nature of the software and consumer electronics 
markets raises concerns that the blanket twenty-year mini-
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mum patent term under TRIPs overprotects software and re-
stricts competition decades after a patent is granted.220 This 
Note offers two solutions. First, TRIPs should be modified to 
explicitly state that software is patentable subject matter and 
to clarify what qualifies as a “new . . . inventive step . . . capa-
ble of industrial application” under Article 27.221 Second, the 
minimum patent term for software under TRIPs should be re-
duced from twenty years to five years, allowing signatories to 
adopt patent terms that better reflect market realities. These 
changes would aid consumer electronics product development 
by increasing the predictability of global software patentability, 
and increase competition by allowing signatories to deny mo-
nopolies that extend far beyond the scope and product life of 
the original invention. 
A. TRIPs Should be Modified to Clarify that Software is Pa-
tentable Subject Matter, with a Clear Standard Readily 
Adoptable by Legislatures 
The lack of clarity on software patentability is one of the chief 
failures of TRIPs that must be addressed. Conflicting language 
in Article 27 of TRIPs has left it unclear whether “pure” soft-
ware with no physical manifestation is patentable, and what 
standard of patentability should be adopted for software.222 The 
ambiguity of Article 27 has therefore left these questions large-
ly up to signatory countries.223 The differences that result are 
clearly illustrated in the differences between the U.S. and U.K. 
approaches to patent law, as discussed in Parts II.B and II.C. 
This ambiguity has disadvantages that harm the global mar-
kets for software and consumer electronics. The varying legal 
standards for software patentability can lead to disparate re-
sults in patent litigation, as seen in the Apple v. Samsung and 
HTC v. Apple cases. The prospect of disparate results can set 
off global patent battles of the type seen here; invalidation or 
enforcement in one country may just prompt further litigation 
                                                                                                                                     
 220. Note, Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, 103 
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in another.224 This unpredictability increases the costs of pa-
tent litigation by requiring patent holders and defendants to 
prepare for litigation under a dizzying number of legal stand-
ards.225 Often, the only entities that can bear the high costs of 
international patent litigation are large corporations, placing 
new inventors and startup companies at a disadvantage.226 
These issues demonstrate the toll that the current ambiguity of 
software patentability has taken on global markets by compli-
cating the process of marketing software and consumer elec-
tronics globally.227 
TRIPs should therefore be modified to explicitly state that 
software is patentable subject matter. Further, it should allow 
patents on “pure software,” without effects external to the com-
puter, provided that it meets the remaining requirements un-
der TRIPs. Software is certainly a “field of technology,” as re-
quired under Article 27 of TRIPs;228 the question is if it is inca-
pable of “industrial application” absent some effect external to 
the software itself.229 Some speculate that TRIPs did not adopt 
“pure software” patents because diverging views precluded 
them.230 But even countries with narrow patent regimes, like 
the U.K., allow “pure software” patents in some instances.231 A 
more unified global standard will provide numerous ad-
vantages to software and consumer electronics firms by in-
creasing incentives to invent while protecting software devel-
opers globally.232 Additionally, a clear standard for software 
patentability will increase predictability in the international 
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patent system.233 In turn, greater predictability will reduce the 
cost of global patent litigation234 and allow software firms to 
better focus their research and development.235 In sum, modify-
ing TRIPs to clarify the legal standard for software patentabil-
ity would help foster innovation in the field while saving vast 
sums on litigation that could instead be spent on research and 
development. 
B. TRIPs Should Reduce the Minimum Patent Term for Soft-
ware to Accommodate the Unique Attributes of the Software and 
Consumer Electronics Industries 
While clarifying TRIPs to allow for “pure software” patents 
would have numerous advantages, it would also substantially 
broaden the scope of patentability. This creates additional 
problems, as broad standards for software patentability have 
contributed to the massive proliferation of software patents.236 
This proliferation creates “patent thickets” that must be 
“hacked” through by competitors before a product can be com-
mercialized, creating significant barriers to entry.237 As more 
patents for software are issued, it becomes increasingly likely 
that a new product will accidently infringe upon a patent.238 
This can be particularly problematic in the smartphone indus-
try, as the average smartphone implicates approximately 
200,000 patents.239 Further, large companies frequently amass 
software patents not for use in an invention, but to obtain bet-
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ter bargaining positions in cross-licensing negotiations.240 The 
massive proliferation of software patents puts small firms and 
startups at a serious disadvantage, as it costs on average over 
one million dollars to challenge a patent.241 
Many of these problems could be solved if the patent period 
for software was significantly reduced to five years, lessening 
the incentive to amass patents.242 However, TRIPs currently 
stands as a barrier to such action, as the treaty mandates a 
twenty-year minimum patent period regardless of the field of 
technology.243 TRIPs should therefore be modified to create an 
exception for software, reducing the minimum patent term to 
five years. There are significant differences in the software in-
dustry that counsel such an approach. While some industries, 
like pharmaceuticals, require long patent periods to allow firms 
to recoup research costs, software development is relatively 
cheap.244 Additionally, software has a very short “shelf life,” as 
advances in the field typically render a patent obsolete before 
the term even expires.245 Software is also designed by using ex-
isting algorithms to perform new functions in a “building block” 
approach.246 Preventing these algorithms from entering the 
public domain harms innovation by preventing new developers 
from using these tools to improve upon the basic building 
blocks of the industry.247 Therefore, modifying TRIPs to allow 
for a shorter patent term would improve innovation by allowing 
the necessary tools for development to enter the public domain 
earlier. 
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CONCLUSION 
While the TRIPs regime was a landmark development in 
global intellectual property rights and patent harmonization, it 
was drafted while the consumer software industry was in a 
state of relative infancy. Since it was adopted, software and 
consumer electronics have become one of the most important 
industries for global trade and technological development. 
TRIPs should therefore be revisited to reflect this reality by 
clarifying the level of protection that software receives, while 
reducing its patent term to bring more software into the public 
domain and encourage innovation. This will not be an easy 
task—TRIPs took over seven years of negotiations to be passed 
in its current form.248 However, the ambiguous status of the 
global patent system illustrated by the recent Apple-Android 
patent war demonstrates that action must be taken. With some 
effort, a system can be adopted that serves the software and 
consumer electronics industries rather than hindering them. 
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